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Introduction
Is it paternalistic of us in the West to try to liberate women who
insist that they’re happy as they are? No, I think we’re on firm
ground. If most Saudi women want to wear a tent, if they don’t
want to drive, then that’s fine. But why not give them the choice?
. . . If Saudi Arabians choose to kill their economic development
and sacrifice international respect by clinging to the 15th century,
if the women prefer to remain second-class citizens, then I suppose
that’s their choice. But if anyone chooses to behave so foolishly, is
it any surprise that outsiders point and jeer? (Nicholas Kristof)
I
N 2011, NEW ZEALAND CARTOONIST MALCOLM EVANS ARTICULATED
a pithy truth. His cartoon, “Cruel Culture,” shows two women
looking at each other, one blond and donning a bikini and sun-
glasses, the other in a burqa with only her eyes showing. The blonde’s
thought bubble reads, “Everything covered but her eyes. What a
cruel male-dominated culture,” while the burqa-clad woman’s
thought bubble reads, “Nothing covered but her eyes. What a cruel
male-dominated culture.” A whole history is embedded in this
encounter. The simple dichotomy between oppressed and empowered
women structuring most media representations of Western and Mus-
lim femininities upholds broader political divisions, in which indi-
vidual choice, sexual freedom, and visibility are aligned with
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Western modernity and democracy, while conformity, modesty, and
veiling are aligned with antiquated religious oppression. In both
cases, women’s bodies are used as sites onto which multiple differ-
ences—political, religious, sexual, and cultural—are either imagina-
tively resolved (belly dancing) or reinforced (the veil).1 Saudi
women’s social agency and public visibility are not merely a matter
of choice, but part of complex political, religious, economic, and
colonial histories. Kristof’s derisive dismissal of them exemplifies the
media’s failure to think historically and its simplistic deployment of
neoliberalized notions of choice. While the stock media image of the
veiled Muslim woman threatens neoliberal individualism and its col-
lapsed notions of sexual and political freedom, the image of the belly
dancer, as circulated in contemporary Western popular culture, fos-
ters a fantasy of a global (read: universal2 ) femininity that is exposed
and free. However, as practiced outside of these commodified media
contexts, both veiling and belly dancing take on very different, often
contradictory meanings that may reveal the histories (of gender,
colonialism, modernity, and multiculturalism) that they “drag” with
it.
“Drag”—specifically “cultural drag” and “temporal drag”—offers a
way of understanding belly dancing as a theatrical practice that is
fraught with ambivalences, fantasies, and unfinished histories. The
veil, as a socio-religious practice, is not more authentic within this
framework; rather, it is the politicized counterpart to the eroticized
fantasy that belly dancing performs. One of the contradictions is that
many Arab/Muslim women continue to belly dance for employment
and pleasure, while Western women have been drawn to belly
dancing as a way to feel more sexually empowered. Moreover, the tra-
dition of male belly dancers remains curiously absent in most
historical accounts and contemporary practices, while the tradition of
belly dancing as a spiritual, feminist practice is often dismissed as
trivial or appropriative. The erasure of belly dancing’s queer and
feminist histories enables the dance to sustain a fantasy of timeless
femininity, a fantasy that upholds broader narratives of modernity
that depend, in part, on the circulation of the publicly visible, sexual-
ized female body as a sign of freedom and choice within a free market
economy. Popular culture representations of belly dancing and media
representations of the veil can work together to project polarized
images of Western and Muslim femininities, which are understood
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through such binaries as exposed/concealed, timeless/time-bound,
universal/restricted, accessible/controlled, free/oppressed. This
dualistic image system obscures belly dancing’s queer and feminist
histories and the veil’s use as a symbol of protest and practice of
subjectification. In a moment when hostilities surrounding the veil
are gaining force and belly dancing is permeating popular culture, it
seems especially urgent to historicize these practices, along with the
public fantasies that cluster around them, and to mark moments
when fantasies of exposure become acts of violence, real and
imagined.
Historically, belly dancing and the veil have operated as dialectical
counterparts in the West’s imagery of Arab and Muslim femininity,
playing at the boundary, respectively, between timelessness and
backwardness, exposure and concealment, truth and secret, freedom
and oppression. In her trenchant study Imagining Arab Womanhood,
Amira Jarmakani traces the ways in which Orientalist images of belly
dancers, veils, and harems have circulated in twentieth- and twenty-
first century US media and popular culture. Images of sensual belly
dancing Arab women and veiled Muslim women, Jarmakani argues,
promote a national narrative of expansionism, consumerism, and
progress; function as “nostalgic foils for twentieth- and twenty-first
century ‘progress’”: and mitigate the disorienting “spatiotemporal
shifts in the context of modernization and industrial capitalism” (24,
140). She calls the discourse and imagery around veils, belly dancing,
and harems “cultural mythologies,” since they are naturalized,
divorced from their historical and cultural context and invested with
the meanings of the appropriating culture. And yet the remaining
historical traces make them appear “accurate and authentic represen-
tations of Arab womanhood” (4–5). Jarmakani historicizes representa-
tions of belly dancing, veils, and harems in relation to growing
tensions between the United States and the Middle East. For exam-
ple, as she points out, “contemporary representations of veiled women
cast them as categorically oppressed, metaphorically implying the
brutal patriarchal system under which they supposedly live,” whereas
“[i]mages of transparently veiled women in early-twentieth-century
advertisements. . . eroticize the scene as they suggest the figure to be
a coquettish, easily available harem girl” (8). These shifting attitudes
toward the veiled Muslim woman tell us that the fantasy of exposing
the Muslim woman—making her known to a US gaze—are an
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extension of broader political relations between the United States and
the Middle East.
Adding to our understanding of the kinds of fantasies belly danc-
ing promotes in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, Sunaina Maira argues in her incisive analysis of belly dancing
in the San Francisco Bay Area that:
belly dancing performances are entangled with the imperial
engagements that link the United States and the Middle East and
reveal a deeper politics of imperialism, racialization, and feminism
in this moment of US empire. The massive appeal of belly dancing
and its growing resonance with white American women since
2001 needs to be situated in relation to contemporary gender and
nationalist politics. (318)
She rightly adds, “Belly dance performances detach Orientalized
femininity from the bodies of Arab women themselves so that it
becomes a form of racial masquerade” (33). With its (mythologized)
Middle Eastern origins, belly dancing provides Western women an
opportunity to play a different role, adopt an alter ego, and perform a
fantasy of embodiment and female community unavailable to them in
their commercialized, individualistic Western societies. That is, belly
dancing gives women license to imitate an idea of femininity that
feels more valued, less burdened by history, politics, and capitalist
exploitation. Far from being strictly a US or even Western fascina-
tion, belly dancing is popular among thousands of women in
Australia, Korea, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, Mongolia,
and China, as well as the countries in the Middle East and Central
Asia where it has been traditionally practiced.
While Orientalism is a crucial concept, looking at belly dancing
solely through this lens perpetuates stereotypes and binary divisions
between East and West and fails to explain the dance’s circulation in
Latin America, China, or other non-Western countries. Rather, the
dance can be seen as a hybrid site that enacts and absorbs individual
and collective anxieties and longings. Despite its global circulation,
belly dancing replays a remarkably stable fantasy of heteronormative
femininity, affirming Said’s claim that the (masculine) gaze of
Orientalism sees the Middle East as “static, frozen, fixed eternally,”
incapable of “development, transformation, human movement” (208).
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As Donnalee Dox writes, “The Orientalist fantasy of secluded, sensual
women that. . . marked the East’s alterity to European culture in the
19th century remains a foundation of belly dancing’s appeal to
Western practitioners and audiences today” (53). It is as if this stable
fantasy of Middle Eastern women allows imaginative control over
Islamic cultures that have become increasingly misunderstood and
threatening to Western hegemony. However, belly dancing performs
an idea of timeless gender and sexuality to which many Western
women are deeply attached. With poststructuralism radically destabi-
lizing gender and sexuality, and capitalism relentlessly commodifying
them, belly dancing offers women imaginative control over their
bodies and sexualities, giving them access to an experience of gender
they find both fascinating and reassuring.
Seeing belly dancing as a form of drag reframes it as a performance
of identification, imitation, and longing, wherein fantasy assumes
material form and political implications. As a critical lens, cultural
drag loosens connotations of authenticity and timelessness associated
with belly dancing, emphasizing instead its theatricality, ambiva-
lence, and affective investment in a cross-cultural fantasy of gender
identity. Although belly dancers do not perform with the ironic,
knowing wink often deployed by gay male drag—the wink that
gestures toward the artificiality and duplicity of the performance—
reading belly dancing as drag complicates claims to cultural authen-
ticity and foregrounds gender and culture as mimetic performances
that play out the remainders of intersecting histories—of moderniza-
tion and colonialism—which are also histories of heterosexualization.
Butler defines drag: “At its best,” she writes, “drag is a site of a cer-
tain ambivalence, one that reflects the more general situation of being
implicated in regimes of power by which one is constituted and,
hence, of being implicated in the very regimes of power that one
opposes” (Bodies that Matter 384). Precisely this ambivalence can be
read into Western belly dancing performances, which oscillate
between complicity and resistance, fascination and longing, essential-
ism and performativity. Maira rightly explains, “the performance of
belly dance by American women represents not so much their
ambivalence about Middle Eastern culture, but their ambivalence
about their own culture—its individualism, materialism, or restrictive
body image ideals” (334). Western women are drawn to belly
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dancing because it gives them access to a relationship with their bod-
ies and their communities that they have lost or been denied.
Thus, belly dancing also implies an identification with and a desire
to learn something from Middle Eastern femininity, which is so
persistently and reductively cast as the Western femininity’s Other.
More precisely, belly dancing suggests a desire to know what
Western and Arab/Muslim femininities mean in relation to each other.
As Butler writes, “the understanding of identification as enacted
fantasy or incorporation” makes clear that “coherence is desired,
wished for, idealized, and that this idealization is an effect of a corpo-
real signification” (Gender Trouble 185). Belly dancing idealizes a
mythic Middle Eastern femininity, which is understood as sensual
without being degraded and objectified, and this idealization reveals
a desire for coherent subjectivity among Western women living in a
cultural context saturated with hypersexualized images of female
bodies. Butler states: “In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals
the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency”
(Gender Trouble 187). Likewise, in imitating a culture—a culture
imaginatively projected as a counterimage of Western modernity—
belly dancing reveals the imitative, contingent, and historical struc-
ture of cultural identity. Western belly dancers long to inhabit a
body that is valued, and yet also a body coded as distant, timeless,
universal—free from the constraints of culture and history. Part of
belly dancing’s ambivalence lies in the desire to have it both ways: to
grasp identity as something stable and knowable, but also to play
with identity as a malleable and spontaneous performance.
Belly dancing might also be read as performing a particular
relationship with time and history captured by Elizabeth Freeman’s
concept of “temporal drag.” Temporal drag describes a movement of
time that does not advance linearly, but instead pushes forward and
pulls back like a wave, leaving debris in its wake. Freeman argues
that the formation of subjectivity is a matter of time and timing, of
assimilating or “binding” our bodies to a culture’s norms of time
allocation, which revolve around heteronormative familial structures
and an appropriate distribution between work and leisure (what she
calls “chrononormativity”). By inhabiting these normative tempos,
our flesh is made legible, shaped into socially acceptable forms of
embodiment (4). Temporal drag, Freeman explains, must be
understood on the level of “collective political fantasy,” rather than
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individual psychology, which is then “exteriorized as a mode of
bodily adornment or even habitus” (65). Historical time shapes our
bodies in similar ways. How does belly dancing produce a form of
feminine embodiment that reads as timeless, universal? Staging a
stylized, mythic feminine sensuality, belly dancing enacts a longing
for a femininity uncomplicated by legacies of imperialism,
consumerism, and feminism, even as it “drags” these histories along
with it. In this way, the dance performs a fantasmic scene of the
unfinished, disavowed histories of Western modernity.
Belly Dancing and the Drag of History
“How does Orientalism transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch
to another?” Said asks (15). One way is through the bodies, affects,
fantasies that keep history alive. As an embodied performance steeped
in Orientalist ideas about the Middle East, belly dancing offers a rich
example of the way affects and fantasies get translated into history.
“Belly dancing” is itself a Western term, coined by American
musician and entrepreneur Sol Bloom after seeing Fahreda Mazar
Spyropoulos and Fatima Djemille (both of whom were known by the
stage name “Little Egypt”) perform danse du ventre at the 1893
Chicago World’s Fair. Since Fatima Djemille was captured in an early
silent film, Fatima (dir. James H. White, 1896), the image of the
exotic belly dancer has circulated in Western popular culture as a
seductive spectacle of cultural and sexual difference.3 Early twentieth
century female burlesque performers took up the dance, which
dovetailed with the Salome craze that swept New York in 1907 and
became a stock striptease routine. This marks the beginning of the
West’s enduring fascination with these dances, or so the story goes,
and since then belly dancing has been practiced continually in
Western countries, with ebbs and flows in popularity.
Belly dancing has also circulated through patterns of immigration
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Syrians, Lebanese,
Turks, Greeks, Egyptians, and other people from the Middle East
immigrated to North and South America, the dance began to be
performed and adapted by immigrants in their new countries (Bures
87–88). Dance scholars Anthony Shay and Barbara Sellers-Young
explain that belly dancing is a genre “best conceptualized as a
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complex of movement practices that originated in a vast region
extending from the Atlantic Ocean in North Africa and the Balkans
in the west to the eastern areas of China, Central Asia, and the west-
ern portions of the Indian subcontinent in the east.” These dances,
performed traditionally by both men and women, are “characterized
by improvised articulations of the torso, hands, arms, and head” (14).
Raqs Sharqi, or Egyptian cabaret-style, is the most commonly
adapted form in the West, along with Turkish, or Oriental-style.
More contemporary forms, developed mainly in the United States, are
called Tribal and Tribal Fusion.
In the 1960s, as the Women’s Liberation Movement was getting
off the ground and the gender norms and sexual mores of the 1950s
were beginning to loosen, belly dancing was taken up in the United
States as leisure activity among middle-class women. Belly dance
continued to circulate in this period through old Hollywood films,
instructional albums made by dancers like €Ozel T€urbas,4 and
through classes taught by former performers. The dance provided
women with a fantasy femininity that transcended time and place,
encapsulating many Western middle-class women’s dream of a
sensual body liberated from patriarchy and domesticity, careers and
car pools, sexualized images and sexual competition. Barbara Sellers-
Young explains that during this period belly dancing was also
approached as a vehicle for feminists to reclaim their bodies from a
history of patriarchal oppression (141). Since the 1960s, belly danc-
ing has grown in popularity among middle-class women around the
world. In a recent study, sociologist Angela M. Moe interviewed and
observed belly dancers in the United States, identifying four feminist
aims of the dance: “healing, sisterhood, spirituality, and empower-
ment” (3; see also Tiggeman et al.). Her research began with her own
experience in belly dancing classes, and she reflects on her initial
ambivalence toward the dance, writing, “I was immediately struck
with an apparent contradiction: If this dance was a mechanism for
women’s oppression, why did it feel so good?” (7). Moe and other
American women use belly dancing to help define the boundary
between empowered and objectified sexuality, an enduring sticking
point in feminist discourse.
As a primarily female-centered practice, belly dancing today is a
worldwide industry, with classes, competitions, conventions, univer-
sity clubs, and associations in cities around the world. Three claims
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are articulated again and again by contemporary belly dancers: That
belly dancing is an art; that it is authentic; and that it is empowering.
Designating the dance as art distances it from more explicitly sexual
performances, such as stripping. Authenticity—often located in the
historically and culturally distant, the ancient or the foreign—is itself
a highly manufactured concept that designates, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, what has not yet been sullied by the processes of commercial-
ization. Younger dancers, however, tend to emphasize the modern
twist they give to belly dancing. As a concept associated with the
Western principle of progress, modern codes these performances as
liberating and liberated, free from tradition and the vexed history in
which the dance is enmeshed. Finally, belly dancing is considered an
empowering practice. Rosalind Gill crucially problematizes this over-
used term, empowerment, pointing out that, in our postfeminist
neoliberal media environment, notions like choice, agency, and empower-
ment have “become commodified—used to sell everything from wash-
ing powder to cosmetic surgery.” Emptied of its meaning and
specificity, “sexual empowerment,” she argues, has “become one of
the tropes of sexualized culture: everywhere we are confronted by
images of empowered female sexuality” (743). “Empowerment” has
“itself become a normatively demanded feature of young women’s
sexual subjectivity, such that they are called on routinely to perform
confident, knowing heterosexiness” (737). Belly dancing fosters the
feelings of empowerment and sexual confidence necessary to a norma-
tive heterosexiness—the “new normal” for young women living in a
sexualized culture. Having successfully internalized the processes of
objectification, women have learned not only to self-objectify, but
also to see this self-objectification as a form of empowerment because
done by choice.
The development of belly dancing has not been one-directional,
however, nor has the dance been entirely divorced from meaningful
traditions and values. R.F. Al-Rawi points out that after belly
dancing became popular in North America and Europe in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “Arab dancers began to
incorporate Western dancing in their performances.” She explains,
“The dancing that used to be performed in a highly concentrated,
nearly meditative and inward state. . . now took a more extravagant
and extroverted turn.” Broader movements, frenetic twirls, and seduc-
tive costumes “combined with the Western image of the Oriental” to
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produce the enduring images we associate with belly dancing. With
its “mythologized qualities of sensuality and traditionalism,” Al-Rawi
argues, belly dancing appealed to “an early-twentieth-century urban
population inundated with the technological developments and
mechanization of daily life in the early industrial era.” Al-Rawi
sympathizes with second wave feminist’s attraction to belly dancing
later in the century, who were drawn to its more traditional inward,
meditative mode, although critiques their “apolitical standpoint” and
“refusal to take into account the individual’s involvement in history.”
For Al-Rawi, belly dancing becomes a libratory, healing, and spiri-
tual practice when it is situated in the dancer’s specific cultural and
historical context, whatever that may be. Only in its connection to
the conditions of a particular time, place, and performer does the
dance become “more than just a dance,” but a practice that “refines
energy and consciousness”; lends “meaning and depth,” “peace,”
“sensuality and inner freedom” to women’s life experience; and pro-
vides an “opportunity to express many different selves” (Al-Rawi). In
contrast to the stable, timeless femininity that many Western belly
dancing performances foster, the dance, if practiced with a historical
and cultural consciousness, provides access to multiple identities.
A largely ignored part of belly dancing’s history is the popularity
of male belly dancers throughout the Middle East and Ottoman
Empire. While historically, there were both male and female (cengi)
belly dancers in the Ottoman Empire, the cross-dressing boy belly
dancer (k€ocek, zenne, or rakkas) emerged in the nineteenth century
when, as Judith Lynne Hanna explains, it was deemed improper for a
woman to perform publicly.5 Hanna notes that “the Turkish capital
in 1805 had about six hundred boys” dancing in taverns (meyhanes),
and since Turks considered the dance profession degrading, “most of
the boys were Greek, Armenian, or Jewish” (57). K€oceks dressed in
feminine costumes and toured around the Empire, which, in 1806,
spanned modern day Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Palestine,
Serbia, and Romania. While older males also toured and danced in
taverns, it was the young k€oceks who performed in the palace and
participated in the culture of pederasty practiced there (57). Young
male dancers continue to perform today in the rural communities of
Turkey, as well as in Morocco and parts of the Middle East (57);
however, the formation of a modern, “Westernized” Turkish Republic
in 1923, under the powerful leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atat€urk,
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meant such practices were largely eradicated, along with sexual,
ethnic, and religious differences of the k€oceks and the audiences who
watched them. Meanwhile, today, contemporary Turkish belly
dancers, such as Didem Kınalı, cater to a fantasy of modern
heteronormative femininity. Without lapsing into Orientalist depic-
tions of a feminized Middle East,6 belly dancing—so bound as it is
to notions of universal, timeless femininity—reveals the historic role
that the heteronormativity and the public visibility of the female
body plays in narratives of modernity.
Not only belly dancing boys but also covered women were obsta-
cles to Atat€urk’s idea of a modern Turkish Republic. In 1925, he
instituted a ban on religious attire (the face veil, headscarf, turban,
and fez), and women wearing headscarves were prohibited from
attending universities and working in the public sector as teachers,
lawyers, doctors, and public servants (“Turkey: Situation of Women
who Wear Headscarves”).7 Turkey’s modernization meant adopting
“homosexual” and “heterosexual” as the defining categories of sexual
difference and legislating the public visibility of Turkish women.
However, amid the recent political and religious polarization in
Turkey and after the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) removed the ban on religious cloth-
ing on February 9, 2008, there has been a marked increase in veiling
practices throughout Turkey.
Belly dancing does not signify timelessness and universality in the
Middle East, but rather bears the historical traces of colonialism that
have imbued the dance with connotations of Western imperialism
and sexual immorality (Shay and Sellers-Young 16–17). In conserva-
tive parts of the Middle East today, belly dancing is held in strong
disrepute. Professional belly dancers are thought to be committing
haram (a forbidden or sinful act) and routinely face prejudice, except
while on stage where they are a source of pleasure for heterosexual
male spectators. And as extremism spreads throughout the Middle
East, the dance has been increasingly censored; it is outlawed in Iran
and Afghanistan, for example, and in Egypt, floor work and exposed
midriffs have been banned. In September 2014, a belly dancing
reality show was pulled off the air by the government after just one
episode (“Egypt’s First Reality Show Pulled Off Air”). And yet belly
dancers continue to perform in tourist locations in Egypt, such as in
hotels, on Nile boat cruises, and in restaurants, catering to a traveling
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Western gaze that sees the belly dancer as an authentic expression of
a Middle Eastern cultural tradition. Belly dancers also perform for a
local male audience in cabarets, who see them as a source of entertain-
ment. These dancers who perform for tourists and locals alike inevita-
bly participate in the dance’s vexed history. Belly dancing performs a
half a century of ambivalence surrounding modern sexuality, and
women’s bodies, whether concealed or exposed, have been the primary
sites onto which sexual anxieties have been projected. As cultural and
temporal drag—a theatrical performance and movement of history—
belly dancing puts into play a collective political fantasy, in which
the West wishes to expose the Middle East, while the Middle East
protects itself from the political imperialism and moral debauchery of
the West.
Turkey productively complicates binaries like East/West,
homosexual/heterosexual. In the last several years, the k€ocek or zenne
has made a comeback in Istanbul amid a cultural moment in which
global queer politics have converged with a nostalgic return to the
country’s Ottoman past, encouraged by the AKP government. While
drag queens and transvestites have a firm place in Istanbul’s cultural
scene, the zenne is specific to Turkey’s history. As Tara Isabella Bur-
ton reports, the revival of zenne dancers has also been spurred by the
popularity of Mehmet Binay and M. Caner Alper’s film Zenne Dancer,
a fictionalized account of the 2007 “honor killing” of belly dancer
Ahmet Yildiz, believed to have been carried out by his father after
finding out his son was having a same-sex affair with a German photo
journalist. Istanbul zenne dancer Segah admits it is difficult to be
openly gay outside of the country’s largest and most liberal city,
although he claims, “When I dance, I create a kind of gender confu-
sion. I am a man – with a beard! – but I’m dancing just like a
woman [would]. And that really shocks people. They’re shocked into
enjoying it” (qtd. in Burton). Dancing at the intersection of Western
and Islamic cultures, Segah shocks spectators with a form of cultural
and temporal drag that takes up Ottoman history to fashion a con-
temporary performance of gender confusion. Valerie Traub poses a
question that this example raises: “How does the pervasive association
of sexual identity with modernity and the West affect the utility of
lesbian, gay, and queer discourses for Islamic cultures, past and
present?” (2–3).
40 Joanna Mansbridge
Belly Dancing in Contemporary Popular Culture:
Performing Sexual Democracy
Belly dancing takes on different meanings in different contexts, and
it can both reinforce and resist the sexualization of culture and the
sexualization of concepts like democracy and freedom. In twenty-first-
century Western popular culture, belly dancing plays out a collective
fantasy of cross-cultural relations, in which religious and ethnic differ-
ences are displaced by a myth of timeless, global femininity that the
dance promotes. In this context, the sensual Middle Eastern woman
signifies a kind of universal feminine, while the veiled Muslim
woman of the Western imagination operates as the sexual and politi-
cal Other of this fantasy. Jonathon Brandeis’s documentary American
Bellydancer: The Pursuit of Life, Liberty, and Dance encapsulates the
ways in which this dance has been mobilized in twenty-first-century
popular culture as a form of cultural knowledge. The film tracks
Miles Copeland, founder of IRS Records and former manager of The
Police and Sting, as he tries to put together a touring belly dancing
show featuring prominent American belly dancers. His stated goal is
to bring belly dancing deeper into American culture, thus fostering
greater understanding between the United States and the Middle
East. However, as the subtitle suggests, the pursuit of the film is
inextricably tied to an American ideology of freedom and democracy,
as mapped onto and enacted by the bodies of American belly dancers.
Sadie and Kaya, semifinalists on season ten of “America’s Got
Talent,” and their popular veil dance offer an explicit example of
Western individualism masquerading as a mythologized Middle East.
Sadie and Kaya perform a heteronormative, body-focused femininity
that is aligned with both patriotism and the American Dream. Here,
the exposed Western female body signifies (and sexualizes) the Wes-
tern concepts of freedom and democracy. Sadie and Kaya relish their
real bodies and real dreams before the affectively charged backdrop of
a waving American flag, as the applauding audience and appreciative
judges affirm their performance. It is the dream of opportunity and
stardom reimagined in the most evident avenue available to women
—through their sexualized bodies. Sadie’s belly dancing performances
have even gone viral, garnering upward of twenty-seven million views
on YouTube. Born in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, Sadie Marquardt travels
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to S~ao Paulo, Mexico City, London, and New York City to perform
and teach belly dancing, styling herself as a fusion of orientalist fan-
tasy and global pop culture sensation. The biography page of Sadie’s
Web site features her almond-shaped green eyes peering through a
veil that covers the rest of her face and hair. On either side of this
visage are smaller images of her, unveiled and posing seductively in a
gold belly dancing costume (“Sadie’s Biography”). This particular
fantasy of exposure can be read as the unconscious counterpart of the
ubiquitous images of veiled Muslim women in the Western media.
Sadie’s drag symbolically exposes the veiled Muslim woman, while
promoting a global femininity paradoxically coded as both timeless
and American.
On the British reality television show franchise “Got Talent,” belly
dancers are common, illustrating the ways in which the imperialist
traces of the dance have been translated via the global circulation of
Western popular culture. Produced by Simon Cowell, “Got Talent” is
cited in the 2014 Guinness World Records as the “Most Successful
Reality TV Format” of all time (“Simon Cowell’s ‘Got Talent’”).
With over fifty-eight versions, the reality show’s worldwide reach is
expansive and its brand recognition extremely high. Several belly
dancers have appeared on Britain’s “Got Talent,” including a seventy-
one-year-old belly dancer named Jan Price; belly dancer Farah Cicek-
dag made it to the semi-finals of the 2010 season of “Australia’s Got
Talent”; and belly dancer Alla Kushnir was the winner of the 2011
season of “Ukraine’s Got Talent.” Indeed, belly dancers have appeared
on the British, American, Australian, Korean, Indian, the Ukrainian,
Vietnam, China, and the Arab world versions of “Got Talent.” The
culturally diverse examples of belly dancing’s appeal to both perform-
ers and audiences, and the commodified image system it circulates
within, mobilizes fantasies of femininity and female sexuality to
displace and resolve deep cultural differences. Meanwhile, in cities
like Dubai and Abu Dhabi, petro-sheikhs pack Western-style strip
clubs to watch nude female dancers. In both cases, the exposed female
body, whether the belly dancing reality star or the stripper, acts as a
reassuring symbol, a short hand way for a culture or nation to show
that it is on side with modernity and a free market.
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of belly dancing’s global
popularity can be seen in Columbian-born singer, songwriter, and
choreographer Shakira’s trademark belly dancing routine. Shakira’s
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self-exoticization resonates with a younger audience that envisions
themselves as cosmopolitan consumers, her blond-haired Latina image
operating as an ideal canvas on which to project fantasies of a global
femininity. With her Columbian nationality and her status as an
American pop culture icon, Shakira embodies a kind of globalized
femininity. During her 2007 concert in Dubai, for example, she pref-
aced her signature concert performance of “Ojos Asi”/“Eyes Like
Those” with a veil dance that plays with the porous boundaries
between visibility and invisibility, as well as between the borders of
the cultures she references. The song’s recognizably Middle Eastern
influences incorporate Arabic chants and use a Phrygian dominant
scale. Shakira sings part of the song in Arabic and has recorded Span-
ish and English versions. Significantly, the lyrics of “Eyes Like Those”
reinforce sight—visibility and the gaze—as legitimizing force of the
song’s female persona, who searches the globe from “Bahrain. . . to
Beirut” for a gaze that will affirm her as the desired object. The
abstracted, desiring gaze for which the woman fruitlessly seeks to find
a comparable replacement in her global travels can be read as the
hegemonic Western gaze, which affirms and defines a globalized fem-
ininity that is visible, heteronormative, sexually available, and “free.”
The veil registers symbolically in Shakira’s performance as a
mobile and permeable boundary that enacts an eroticized movement
between exposure and concealment and, more politically, between the
hypervisibility of the Western female body and the veiled Muslim
female body. As Dox succinctly puts it, “If the idea of women’s veil-
ing in daily public life is perceived as oppressive, then shedding a
costume veil becomes an act of liberation automatically. . . associated
with an industrial, secular, progressive West” (62). Sadie, Kaya and
Shakira all use the guise of a mythic Middle Eastern femininity to
promote images of (sexual and political) freedom within a Western-
defined global democracy. Belly dancing thus performs in these con-
texts a desire to know—to expose and make public—what Muslim
women’s bodies and sexuality mean. Performing in the mythic guise
of the temporally and culturally distant belly dancer, rather than
through the more familiar image of the stripper, Western belly dan-
cers rehearse an act of cultural supremacy that says something like,
“Look at me, looking like you. And yet I’m free and you are impris-
oned.”
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While belly dancing can promote the idea of a global femininity
and sexual democracy, it can also work as a performance of cultural
assimilation. In September 2011 on her popular daytime talk show,
Ellen Degeneres received a belly dancing lesson from Rosalba. Per-
haps the most obvious example of belly dancing as cultural drag, this
segment is most striking for the way Degeneres’s homonormativity
displaces and absorbs cultural difference. Her unthreatening sexual
difference works to make the cultural difference signified by the
dance unthreatening, and her child-like comic persona transforms the
dance’s sexual undertones into playful overtones. Los Angeles-based
belly dancer Rosalba “entered the world of Middle Eastern dance with
a background in Flamenco, Afro-Cuban, Brazilian, and modern
dance,” as it says on her Web site (“Biography”). Rosalba’s appearance
on Ellen is a study in contrasts, as the hyperfeminine, exoticized Ros-
alba teaches the lesbian comedian how to isolate and twist her hips.
With a bejeweled bra and gauzy skirt held together by a nude body
stocking stretched overtop her typically boyish-butch outfit,
Degeneres accentuates her subtly queer sexuality, at the same time as
her incongruous appearance mocks the claims to authenticity and
timelessness made by so many belly dancers. Ultimately, however,
Degeneres’s parodic performance does not queer belly dancing, but
rather further normalizes her own sexuality and illustrates the way
the dance “shores up a multiculturalist or liberal notion of US culture
that can consume elements of other cultures” (Maira 334). Ellen’s
belly dancing performance is a form of cultural drag that mobilizes
her homonormativity, whiteness, and unthreatening child-like quality
to promote an image of harmonious American multiculturalism.
The Veil in History, Media, and Popular Culture
“It’s like they don’t want [women] to have a voice” (King), says
Samantha to her friends as they watch two Muslim women eating
lunch on the patio of a 5-star hotel in Abu Dhabi in Michael Patrick
King’s Sex and the City 2. Leaving New York to escape the depressed
and depressing economic environment, Carrie, Samantha, Miranda,
and Charlotte travel to the wealthy, exoticized Middle East. What
follows thereafter is textbook Orientalism. This scene cited above
ends with a glimmer of recognition from Carrie, who somehow sees
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beyond the veil of the younger Muslim woman and knows that,
despite her covering, the two women are, at heart, the same. This
message is reinforced later in the film when the four sexually savvy
Manhattanites come face to face with five women wearing burqas. As
the Muslim women strip off their coverings to reveal haute couture
clothing and flashy jewelry, Carrie exclaims, “Louis Vuitton!” in a
tone that can only be described as gleeful relief. (They are just like
us!) And her voiceover reduces what is actually a rarely depicted
cross-cultural encounter to an exhibition of hyperconsumerism:
“There. . . halfway across the world, under a hundred of years of tradi-
tion, was this year’s Spring collection” (King). The Middle Eastern
women’s burqas mask their likeness to the Western women, and it is
only after they expose themselves that they can be seen as properly
modern, like Carrie and her friends, who operate as the norm against
which properly modern femininity is judged. The Muslim women in
this scene, and the movie as a whole, simply reflect and reinforce Car-
rie, Samantha, Miranda, and Charlotte’s universal femininity, as
defined by the three key characteristics: consumerism, sexual freedom,
and heteronormativity. In short, the veil, here, threatens the hege-
mony of white, heterosexual, US femininity.
As a socio-religious practice and symbolic object, the veil is a com-
plex, contradictory sign at the center of heated debates surrounding
the limits of religious freedoms within multicultural societies. As
Homa Hoodfar explains, veiling is pre-Islamic. When practiced in
connection with seclusion in Greco-Roman and pre-Islamic Iranian
and Byzantine empires, veiling was a sign of socioeconomic status. In
an Islamic context, veiling practices are culturally specific, and, like
belly dancing, intersect with a history of colonial expansion.8 As a
cultural practice and state of Islamic dress (muhegabba), the veil sym-
bolizes modesty and religious devotion. And although “veiling is
nowhere specifically recommended or even discussed in the Qur’an”
(Hoodfar 6), as Susie Hawkins notes, “With a few exceptions, most
women in Muslim countries are required to wear some form of
Islamic dress.” She adds, “In some countries, donning the hijab is
considered to be the sixth pillar of wisdom—especially in societies
that observe Shari’a law” (Hawkins 95, 97). Within an orthodox
Islamic context, the veiled Muslim woman metonymically protects
the sacredness of Islam, and “Islamists tend to see the role of women
as divinely prescribed in Islamic family law” (Islamic Family Law 90).
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In practice, the veil protects a Muslim woman’s body from the male
gaze and allows freedom of movement in public, giving women access
to education and employment.
As far back as the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-centuries,
the veil has been used by the West to construct an image of the
uncivilized Islamic world, which worked to legitimize colonial occu-
pations by the self-proclaimed civilized European nations. As Hoodfar
points out, by the late-nineteenth-century, “images of Muslim
women were used as a major building block to construct the orient’s
new imagery, an imagery that is intrinsically linked to the hegemony
of western imperialism, particularly that of Britain and France” (8).
Leila Ahmed adds, “Veiling—to Western eyes, the most visible mar-
ker of the differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies—became
the symbol. . . of both the oppression of women. . . and the backward-
ness of Islam” (Women and Gender in Islam, 152). Since the nine-
teenth-century and especially since the Arab–Israeli conflicts began in
the 1960s, veiled Muslim women have been reduced in the Western
imagination to monolithically oppressed victims of a backward cul-
ture, either in need of saving by the liberated West, or subordinated,
by ultraconservative Islamic regimes, to a reactionary struggle against
Western imperialism.
Since the Gulf War and, even more so, since the September 11
attacks, the veil continues to be manipulated by the media as a
monolithic sign of antidemocracy and oppression of Muslim women,
an image that justifies the West’s neocolonial interventions. Ahmed
identifies a “startling” new feature of the post-September 11 public
discourse: “The subject of women in Islam, and in particular women’s
oppression and the emblems of that oppression, such as the veil and
the burka, became recurring themes in the broad public conversation
in America and elsewhere in the West” (Quiet Revolution, 194). In
Women as Weapons of War: Iraq, Sex, and the Media, Kelly Oliver
explains, “Reminiscent of the French occupation of Algeria in the
1950s, the US invasion of Afghanistan focused on the plight of
Afghan women, whose oppression was seen as epitomized by the veil
and the burka” (51). Indeed it was Laura Bush who addressed the
nation, making a plea to liberate the women of Afghanistan by using
gendered and feminist logic, while the Bush administration and the
media made much of the West’s success in liberating Afghani
“women of cover” (Jarmakani 12). Oliver adds, “Efforts to re-veil
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women in Iraq seem to be a reaction against U.S. occupation wherein
westernization becomes associated with women’s sexual freedom as
evidenced by their dress and the amount of body covered or revealed”
(51). What was construed as a humanitarian effort in the 1990s was,
after the September 11 attacks, depicted as an unequivocal “war on
terror,” with the veiled Muslim woman embodying, at once, the
enemy threat and the object in need of saving.
The veiled Muslim woman has become a fixation of a Western
gaze that sees concealment (of the female body) as a threat to democ-
racy and exposure as a sign of (sexual) freedom. In light of the rising
extremism in the Middle East, veiled Muslim women living in Wes-
tern countries have become an overburdened sign of all that threatens
Western democracy and security. They face increasing judgment in
the media and increasing infringements on their public freedoms,
such as the 2011 law in France forbidding Muslim women to veil
their face, Quebec’s Charter of Rights, and the establishment of
“burqa bans” across the UK and Europe. And the spate of “veil
attacks” reported in the United States, France, UK, and Quebec con-
firms Muslim women’s bodies as a conspicuous and volatile site of
political, religious, and ideological conflicts. Islamophobia monitor-
ing group Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) reports
that over half of attacks against Muslims happen against women
wearing the veil. Over 700 such attacks were reported to Tell MAMA
between May 2013 and February 2014 in France, England, the Uni-
ted States, and Quebec (Aziz). For example, a woman was assaulted
in a parking lot in Minnesota, another in a suburban community in
France, and yet another in a mall in Quebec City. In June 2014,
thirty-one-year-old student, Nahid Almanea was stabbed to death on
a footpath in Essex, United Kingdom, a murder allegedly instigated
by her Islamic dress, which consisted of an abaya and patterned head-
scarf (Elgot). There is an urgent need for more dialog relating to
these violent responses to veiled Muslim women living in Western
countries, which might balance the current monocular focus on the
oppression of Muslim women under extremist Islamic regimes.
In a curious replay of the 1980s pornography debates, during
which there was an alignment of right-wing conservatives and anti-
porn feminists in their shared antipornography stance, calls for ban-
ning the niqab and the burqa are shared by the right and many
feminists, who see the veiled Muslim woman as a threat to a free
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(and Christian) Western society. In France, the ban on full-face veil-
ing has been held in place and supported by a public pronouncement
of “a certain idea of living together” (Willsher). As Joan Wallach
Scott argues in Politics of the Veil, France’s laws regulating religious
clothing signal the country’s failure to integrate its former colonial
subjects as full citizens. At the center of the debate, Scott explains,
are opposing views of sexuality: In France, as in much of the West,
sexual openness stands in for normalcy, emancipation, and individual-
ity, while the sexual modesty implicit in the headscarf and, even
more in the niqab, undermines these claims to sexual democracy.
Scott rightly points out that France’s ban exacerbates religious and
ethnic difference by enforcing a cultural homogeneity that is no
longer feasible in France. “By refusing to accept and respect the dif-
ference of these others,” Scott writes, “we turn them into enemies,
producing that which we most feared most about them in the first
place” (19). The ban in France effectively enforces a historically white
Christian hegemony, and in doing so does not allow the veil, or by
extension the cultural and religious practices it metonymically
invokes, to change French culture. With Britain, Belgium, and
Switzerland all now banning face veils, Europe is sending a message
of censorship and separatism cloaked as a message of community and
secularism. These bans prevent Muslim women from freely moving
in public, thus restricting (rather than liberating) them and impeding
chances at a diversely integrated community. Furthermore, attempts
to ban the burqa and niqab in Austria—even though these are worn
by an extremely small proportion of the Muslim women in that coun-
try—are a thinly veiled right-wing campaign that resonates with the
very sexism that it purports to oppose: “Too beautiful for a veil,” is
the phrase printed under a photo of a blonde woman in a Facebook
post by Austria Freedom Party leader and Member of Parliament
Heinz-Christian Strache, who claims to be challenging the “Islamiza-
tion of Europe” (“Campaign Against Muslim Veils”).
The public discourse around the veil has worked to exacerbate
tensions and reduce Muslim women to victims of patriarchy and
religious extremism. As Ayesha Chaudhry explains, the media focus
on veiling has “an adversarial environment by forcing an artificial
binary between national citizenship and religious identity”
(Chaudhry). Chaudhry succinctly summarizes how these debates
divest Muslim women of their agency as subject and citizens:
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Neither forced veiling nor de-veiling actually serves the interests
of women, although secularists argue that de-veiling “saves”
women from patriarchal oppression, and Islamists argue that
veiling “saves” women from an objectifying male gaze that turns
them into sex objects. In both arguments, a woman’s emancipation
or subjugation is measured by the amount her body is covered or
uncovered. Both arguments infantilize women, expressing a
profound mistrust in their ability to make decisions in their own
self-interest. Caught in the middle, Muslim women simply cannot
win. (Chaudhry)
As seen from a Western gaze, the veiled Muslim woman’s seeming
lack of individuality, her explicit demonstration of her commitment
to Islam (as both religion and community), and her refusal to offer
her body as object and spectacle undermines the foundational
principles of Western subjectivity and norms surrounding women’s
public visibility. Hidden from view, she disrupts the free-flowing
circuits of heteronormative desire that are rehearsed in everyday
encounters and circulated in global popular culture products. As a
social and religious practice, as a symbol of protest, and as a seductive
belly dancing prop, the veil plays precisely at the boundary between
such discursive constructions as exposure and concealment, public
and private, empowered and oppressed, which are used to define
Muslim and Western women’s bodies—along with the cultures they
represent—as diametrical opposites. Both enforced veiling and sexual-
ized hypervisibility reduce women to their bodies—to an object to be
looked at or concealed—and in doing so undermine their viability as
political subjects and citizens.
Contemporary veiling practices of Muslim women around the
world exist in complex negotiation with their societies, their religion,
their communities, and their individual choices. Some women wear
the veil because of cultural enforcement, others by choice, and yet
others as protest. Muslim women have historically mobilized the veil
as a sign of protest against patriarchal domination, against European
colonialism, and more recently, against US cultural imperialism. For
example, the veil became a recognizable symbol during the 1979
Iranian revolution, when many young Iranian women willingly
adopted the veil as a sign of protest against the corrupt regime of the
Shah. However, under the Islamic Republic, the new freedoms pro-
mised to women were reneged, and instead “new rules and regula-
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tions concerning all aspects of women’s lives were announced,”
including mandatory adoption of the veil (chador) (Shirazi 116). In
ever growing numbers, Muslim feminists have been wearing the veil
as a sign of resistance to a global system defined according to neolib-
eral Western values of individualism and the free market. Shaista
Gohir, chairman of the Muslim Women’s Network UK, states that
more women have adopted headscarves after the September 11 and
July 7, 2005 attacks on the United States and London respectively, in
part as a way to make visible their religious and cultural difference
from the West and to show pride in their faith and the community
(“British Women Fight Racism with the Veil”). Groups like Muslim
Women Against FEMEN wear the veil as a sign of protest against
Western imperialism and against feminist groups that see veiling as
an unequivocal sign of patriarchal domination. Seen in this light, the
veil becomes a sign not of oppression, but of agency—not the sexual
agency of neoliberal postfeminism, but the agency of mobilized
resistance against unjust systems of domination.
The activist group, Muslim Women against FEMEN (MWAF), for
example, wear diverse types of veils, while holding written statements
that pointedly respond to misunderstandings surrounding the
oppressed Muslim woman of the Western imagination and, specifi-
cally to the radical feminist group, FEMEN. The photographs posted
on the group’s Facebook page show Muslim women from around the
world, each claiming the veil as a sign of their freedom and dignity.
MWAF define themselves as “Muslim women who want to expose
FEMEN for the Islamophobes/Imperialists that they are. We are
making our voices heard and reclaiming our agency” (“Muslim
Women Against FEMEN”). Interestingly, the word “expose” implies
an ideological outing of FEMEN, and not a physical unveiling of the
female body. Although not self-defined as a feminist group, MWAF
can be read as feminist in their praxis in that they advocate
recognition of difference and freedom of choice. With written
statements such as, “Silence is complicity” and “Nudity DOES NOT
liberate me and I DO NOT need saving,” MWAF articulate strong
counterclaims to FEMEN’s condemnation of the veiled Muslim
woman as the emblem of patriarchal oppression and veneration of the
naked white woman as a symbol of freedom from that oppression
(“Muslim Women Against FEMEN”).
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FEMEN is a radical feminist group that formed in 2008 in the
Ukraine. FEMEN members use their exposed bodies to communicate
their political messages, protesting topless around the world, from
the Vatican to Moscow, with militant slogans promoting sexual
freedom written on their naked torsos. FEMEN activists use their
nakedness to demonstrate against sexual exploitation and political
corruption, a startlingly literal tactic in the way it equates public
exposure with social equality. The group states their aims clearly on
the Web site: “Our Mission is Protest. Our Weapon are [sic] bare
breasts!. . . FEMEN’s Goal: complete victory over patriarchy”
(femen.org/about). Driving the movement is the belief that the naked
female body in protest spells the demise of a patriarchal world system
because it demonstrates a woman’s “right to her body.” Echoing
claims made by many belly dancers, who seek through the dance to
reclaim a more authentic, liberated form of embodiment, FEMEN’s
mandate begins with an ahistorical appeal origin: “In the beginning,
there was the body, feeling of the woman’s body, feeling of joy
because it is so light and free. Then there was injustice, so sharp that
you could feel it with your body” (femen.org/about). Staging a
fantasy of exposure in which naked, white female flesh inscribed with
words of protest signifies freedom from patriarchy, FEMEN paradoxi-
cally reinforces women’s bodies as the site of political conflict, reduc-
ing a complex cultural, political, and economic history to a matter of
public exposure and individual choice. In contrast to FEMEN’s essen-
tialism, MWAF continually assert an awareness of history and
emphasize the necessity of recognizing cultural difference. As one
young woman’s Facebook post succinctly puts it, “My freedom looks
different than yours” (“Muslim Women Against FEMEN”). Muslim
women who wear the veil as a sign of agency, religious commitment,
and indivisibility from their community are performing their identi-
ties as changeable, relational, and culturally specific—neither the
oppressed Muslim woman of the Western media nor the timeless
femininity of the Western belly dancer.
As antagonisms between the Middle East and the West intensify
and the tensions surrounding multiculturalism become more pro-
nounced; as Muslim women in the diaspora face hostile scrutiny and
women activists in the Middle East are violently suppressed; and as
Western feminists align themselves with a neoliberal paternalism and
Muslim women rail against the imposition of Western norms of gen-
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der and sexuality, it seems as though, ideologically, the world is
divided to the extreme, even as, geographically, we are living in
unprecedented proximity to religious, racial, and ethnic differences.
Within this scene, belly dancing offers a fantasy of wholeness and
universality. Eroticizing and resolving political tensions with the
image of a postfeminist, postracial, universal femininity, belly
dancing can uphold an idea of global democracy disguised as an
exposed, heterosexual female body. In contrast, the Muslim woman’s
covered body is used by the Western media as a potent symbol of the
oppressive patriarchal Islamic regimes, which Western democracy
must continue to expose and fight against. As opposing symbols of
competing ideologies, women in the West and the Muslim world
learn to see each other as antagonists in a global conflict. In an almost
perfect replay of Malcolm Evans’s cartoon, MWAF and FEMEN
confront one another as moral enemies rather than compatriots of the
same political system,9 in which their bodies are used as an ideologi-
cal battleground and projected back onto the world as a fantasy of
exposure, rather than the drag of history.
Notes
1. Veil is used broadly here. As both a piece of clothing and as a religious practice in Islam, veil-
ing practices vary across Islamic cultures and countries, as do the terms. The hijab refers to the
headscarf and comes from the Arabic word hajaba, or “to hide from view.” The niqab is the face
veil; abaya is a long cloak worn by Saudi Arabian women; chador is the head and shoulder
covering worn by Iranian women; burqa is the full body cloak that covers Muslim women from
head to toe. Of these, the niqab and burqa are the most controversial in the West.
2. Following Inderpal Grewal, “global,” especially as it is used in twenty-first-century public
discourse, is understood as a cognate for “universal” (Grewal 23).
3. Ella Shohat explains the impact of capturing Fatima Djemille in the short film Fatima (Tho-
mas Edison, 1896): “Fatima documents the movements of a dark-haired woman, dressed in
‘exotic’ costume, with her navel shockingly exposed” (Shohat 49). However, a see-through
fence was superimposed onto the celluloid, thus partially covering her bosom and hips.
“Fatima’s alluring dance,” Shohat writes, “was contained through fragmentation and conceal-
ment that simultaneously obscured and revealed. The Oriental woman, now in the West,
was veiled as it were, but only to tantalize the peeping viewer in the dark” (49–50). This
short film is a precursor to the seedy burlesque films produced in the 1950s and 1960s,
which feature bump-and-grind burlesquers dancing for a heterosexual male audience in
gauzy, bejeweled costumes amid Orientalist mise en scenes.
4. The following is a somewhat anecdotal example: An instructional belly dancing album I
found at an antique market in Ankara, Turkey features Turkish-born dancer and actress €Ozel
T€urkbas. Remembered in Turkey today as a star of many Turkish films, T€urkbas moved to
New York City in the 1959 to play the role of “La Orientale” in Franco Zeffirelli’s opera
Thais. She then began dancing in restaurants and eventually made a series of successful belly
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dancing albums with RCA Records targeted to middle-class American women. With titles
such as “How to Make Your Husband a Sultan,” which sold over 150,000 copies in the Uni-
ted States and over one million in Turkey. T€urkbas’s instructional albums affirmed a conven-
tional femininity and her success in both the United States and Turkey suggests the cultural
translatability of the fantasy belly dancing performs. Her American counterpart Ann Corio
released a successful burlesque album in 1963 called “How to Strip for Your Husband,”
which came complete with a g-string and jazz score.
5. Although each has a very distinct cultural and theatrical history, female impersonation on
stage is a practice found in Chinese, Middle Eastern, and British societies, often revolving
around sexual connotations associated with performers and taboos regarding women appear-
ing in public.
6. As Kathryn Babayan and Afsaneh Najmabadi rightly argue, “one cannot exaggerate the signif-
icance of historicizing when it comes to studying gender and sexuality in Islamicate cultures,”
since “Islamic studies and the Islamic world itself continue to be burdened by a scholarly tra-
dition that has all too often situated Islam beyond temporality and geography” (xiii).
7. Erik J. Z€ucker argues that Atat€urk’s ban on religious attire was “motivated as much by a
desire to claim all visible expressions of authority as a monopoly of the state. . . as by the
wish to secularize society” (187).
8. Nations using Islamic law as their national judicial system enforce religious veiling of
women, whereas in countries that use combined or secular legal systems, veiling is not a leg-
ally enforced practice. For example, whereas countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq use Islamic
law as the nation’s judicial system, which extends to the legislated veiling of Muslim
women, countries like Malaysia have a parallel legal system, using both common law and
Islamic law. A secular Muslim nation like Turkey, moreover, uses only common law; here,
the face veil is illegal, while the headscarf signifies traditionalism within a secular Muslim
nation.
9. bell hooks usefully calls this interlocking system “white supremacist-capitalist-patriarchy.”
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